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ORCIDDagstuhl Seminar Proceedings: Computing and Markets 2005
- Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing and Markets, 3.-7. January 2005. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 05011, IBFI, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2005 - Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with failures. - Hongwei Gui, Rudolf Müller, Rakesh V. Vohra:
Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types. - Kazuo Murota:
Fundamentals in Discrete Convex Analysis. - Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations. - Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin:
Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. - Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea, Sascha Wolf:
A Network Approach to Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatible Mechanisms. - Robert W. Day, S. Raghavan:
Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions. - Kevin Leyton-Brown, Navin A. R. Bhat:
Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games. - Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:
05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets. - Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:
05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets. - Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games. - Edward J. Anderson, Frank Kelly, Richard Steinberg:
A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing Capacity in a Communication Network. - Henner Gimpel:
Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining. - Anna Osepayshvili, Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason:
Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions. - Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Local-Effect Games. - Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien:
The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost. - Rainer Feldmann:
Selfish Routing of Splittable Flow with Respect to Maximum Congestion. - Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. - Alon Altman:
The PageRank Axioms. - Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Mechanism Design.
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