Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 65

Volume 65, Number 1, January 2009

• Rabah Amir, Robert J. Aumann, James Peck, Myrna Holtz Wooders:
  Introduction to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Martin Shubik. 1-6
  
• Rabah Amir, Francis Bloch:
  Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games. 7-24
  
• Aloisio Araujo, Luciano I. de Castro:
  Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values. 25-48
  
• André Casajus:
  Outside options, component efficiency, and stability. 49-61
  
• Claude d'Aspremont, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira:
  Price-quantity competition with varying toughness. 62-82
  
• Gabrielle Demange:
  The strategy structure of some coalition formation games. 83-104
  
• Amrita Dhillon, Alexander Herzog-Stein:
  Games of status and discriminatory contracts. 105-123
  
• Pradeep Dubey, Dieter Sondermann:
  Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly). 124-141
  
• Isabel Grilo, Jean-François Mertens:
  Cournot equilibrium without apology: Existence and the Cournot inverse demand function. 142-175
  
• Brit Grosskopf, Alvin E. Roth:
  If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design. 176-204
  
• Luis A. Guardiola, Ana Meca, Justo Puerto:
  Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. 205-219
  
• Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García:
  Walrasian analysis via two-player games. 220-233
  
• Leonidas C. Koutsougeras:
  Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking. 234-241
  
• Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano:
  Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index. 242-255
  
• Paulo Klinger Monteiro:
  First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution. 256-269
  
• Mário R. Páscoa, Abdelkrim Seghir:
  Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes. 270-286
  

• Sergiu Hart:
  Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society. 287
  
• Shmuel Zamir, Salvador Barberà:
  A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler. 288
  

Volume 65, Number 2, March 2009

• Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
  Strong price of anarchy. 289-317
  
• Jonas Björnerstedt, Andreas Westermark:
  Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities. 318-338
  
• Dino Gerardi, Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite:
  Aggregation of expert opinions. 339-371
  
• Ángel Hernando-Veciana:
  Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids. 372-405
  
• Josef Hofbauer, Jörg Oechssler, Frank Riedel:
  Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case. 406-429
  
• Nathan Larson:
  Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions. 430-460
  
• Theo Offerman, Andrew Schotter:
  Imitation and luck: An experimental study on social sampling. 461-502
  
• Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters:
  Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models. 503-515
  
• Vlasta Pokladniková, Muhamet Yildiz:
  Moderation of an ideological party. 516-537
  
• Amnon Rapoport, Tamar Kugler, Subhasish Dugar, Eyran J. Gisches:
  Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox. 538-571
  
• Pedro Rey-Biel:
  Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games. 572-585
  
• Dezsö Szalay:
  Contracts with endogenous information. 586-625
  
• H. Peyton Young:
  Learning by trial and error. 626-643
  

• Theo S. H. Driessen, Cheng-Cheng Hu:
  A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency. 644-648
  

• Sergiu Hart:
  Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society. 649
  

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