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ORCIDSIGecom Exchanges, Volume 7
Volume 7, Number 1, December 2007
- Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. 1-2 - Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg:
An overview of combinatorial auctions. 3-14 - Georg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco:
Combinatorial auctions with tractable winner determination. 15-18 - Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ostroy:
Duality in combinatorial auctions. 19-21 - Robert W. Day, S. Raghavan:
Computing core payments in combinatorial auctions. 22-24 - Ron Lavi:
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design. 25-29 - Shahar Dobzinski:
Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms? 30-33 - Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum:
Mechanism design, machine learning, and pricing problems. 34-36 - Hervé Moulin:
Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms. 37-42 - Moshe Tennenholtz:
Ex-post equilibria in combinatorial auctions. 43-44 - Baharak Rastegari
, Anne Condon, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions. 45-47 - Makoto Yokoo:
False-name bids in combinatorial auctions. 48-51 - Samuel Ieong, Mukund Sundararajan, Anthony Man-Cho So:
Mechanism design for stochastic optimization problems. 52-54 - Daniel Golovin:
More expressive market models and the future of combinatorial auctions. 55-57 - Andrea Giovannucci, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, Meritxell Vinyals, Jesús Cerquides, Ulle Endriss:
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions for supply chain management. 58-60 - Yiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Evdokia Nikolova, David M. Pennock:
Combinatorial betting. 61-64 - Björn Schnizler, Dirk Neumann:
Combinatorial exchanges for coordinating grid services. 65-68 - Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination. 69-70
Volume 7, Number 2, June 2008
- Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. - Michael P. Wellman, Amy Greenwald, Peter Stone:
Book announcement: autonomous bidding agents. - Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings:
Truthful opinions from the crowds. - Dov Monderer:
Implementable allocation rules. - Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira:
Characterizing truthfulness in discrete domains. - Ariel D. Procaccia:
Towards a theory of incentives in machine learning. - Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, David Kempe, Robert Kleinberg:
Online auctions and generalized secretary problems. - Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. - Lonneke Mous, Valentin Robu, Han La Poutré:
Can priced options solve the exposure problem in sequential auctions? - Manish Jain, James Pita, Milind Tambe, Fernando Ordóñez, Praveen Paruchuri, Sarit Kraus:
Bayesian stackelberg games and their application for security at Los Angeles international airport. - Michael Klafft:
Procurement platforms for consumers. - Omer Mahmood, Selvakennedy Selvadurai:
Enabling internet singularity within the electronic commerce trust model. - Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: strategically choosing products to release.
Volume 7, Number 3, November 2008
- Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. - Sanmay Das, Michael Ostrovsky:
Conference announcement: the conference on auctions, market mechanisms, and their applications (AMMA). - Joan Feigenbaum:
Workshop report: NetEcon'08. - Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham:
Book announcements: multiagent systems and essentials of game theory. - Aaron Archer, Robert Kleinberg:
Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces. - Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour:
Item pricing for revenue maximization. - Sudhir Kumar Singh, Vwani P. Roychowdhury, Himawan Gunadhi, Behnam Attaran Rezaei:
Diversification in the internet economy: the role of for-profit mediators. - Lance Fortnow, Rakesh V. Vohra:
The complexity of forecast testing. - Nicolas S. Lambert, David M. Pennock, Yoav Shoham:
Eliciting properties of probability distributions: the highlights. - Paul Resnick, Rahul Sami:
Manipulation-resistant recommender systems through influence limits. - Jon M. Kleinberg, Siddharth Suri, Éva Tardos, Tom Wexler:
Strategic network formation with structural holes. - Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: product adoption in a social network. - Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
Solution to exchanges 7.2 puzzle: strategically choosing products to release.
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